Version 2.9 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy

By admin
Online security is constantly evolving, and thus we are excited to announce the publication of

MRSP
PRODUCT

version

2.9
CARDINAL

, demonstrating that we are committed to keep up with the advancement of the web and further our commitment to a secure and trustworthy internet.

With each update to

the Mozilla Root Store Policy
ORG

(

MRSP
PERSON

), we aim to address emerging challenges and enhance the integrity and reliability of our root store. Version

2.9
CARDINAL

introduces several noteworthy changes and refinements, and within this blog post we provide an overview of key updates to the

MRSP
PRODUCT

and their implications for the broader online community.

Managing the Effective Lifetimes of

Root CA Certificates
ORG


One
CARDINAL

of the most crucial changes in this version of the

MRSP
PRODUCT

is to limit the time that a root certificate may be in our root store. Often, a root certificate will be issued with a validity period of

25 or more years
DATE

, but that is too long when one considers the rapid advances in computer processing strength. To address this concern and to make the web

PKI
ORG

more agile, we are implementing a schedule to remove trust bits and/or the root certificates themselves from our root store after they have been in use for more than a specified number of

years
DATE

.

Under the new section 7.4 of the

MRSP
PRODUCT

, root certificates that are enabled with the website’s trust bit will have that bit removed when

CA
GPE

key material is

15 years old
DATE

. Similarly, root certificates with the email trust bit will have a “

Distrust for S/MIME
WORK_OF_ART

After Date” set at

18 years
DATE

from the

CA
GPE

’s key material generation date. A transition schedule has been established here, which phases this in for

CA
GPE

root certificates created before

April 14, 2014
DATE

. The transition schedule is subject to change if underlying algorithms become more susceptible to cryptanalytic attack or if other circumstances arise that make the schedule obsolete.

Compliance with

CA/Browser Forum’s
ORG

Baseline Requirements for S/MIME Certificates

The CA/Browser Forum released

Baseline Requirements for S/MIME
ORG

certificates (S/MIME BRs), with an effective date of

September 1, 2023
DATE

. Therefore, as of

September 1, 2023
DATE

, certificates issued for digitally signing or encrypting email messages must conform to the latest version of the S/MIME BRs, as stated in

section 2.3
LAW

of the MRSP. Period-of-time audits to confirm compliance with the S/MIME BRs will be required for audit periods ending after October 30,

2023
DATE

. Transition guidance is provided at the following wiki page: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Transition_SMIME_BRs.


Security Incident and Vulnerability
ORG

Disclosure

To enable swift response and resolution of security concerns impacting

CAs
ORG

, guidance for reporting security incidents and serious vulnerabilities has been added to section

2.4
CARDINAL

of the

MRSP
PRODUCT

. Additional guidance is provided in the following wiki page: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Vulnerability_Disclosure.

CCADB Compliance Self-Assessment

Previously, CAs were required to perform an

annual
DATE

self-assessment of compliance with

Mozilla
ORG

’s policies and

the CA/Browser Forum’s
ORG

Baseline Requirements for TLS, but the MRSP did not specifically require that the

annual
DATE

self-assessment be submitted. Beginning in

January 2024
DATE

,

CA
GPE

operators with root certificates enabled with the website’s trust bit must perform and submit

the CCADB Compliance Self-Assessment
LAW

annually (within

92 calendar days
DATE

from the close of their audit period). This will provide transparency into each

CA
GPE

’s ongoing compliance with

Mozilla
ORG

policies and

the CA/Browser Forum’s
ORG

Baseline Requirements for TLS.

Elimination of SHA-1

With the release of

Firefox 52
LAW

in

2017
DATE

,

Mozilla
ORG

removed support for SHA-1 in

TLS
ORG

certificates. Version

2.9
CARDINAL

of the

MRSP
PRODUCT

takes further steps to eliminate the use of SHA-1, allowing it only for end entity certificates that are completely outside the scope of the

MRSP
PRODUCT

, and for specific, limited circumstances involving duplication of an existing SHA-1 intermediate

CA
GPE

certificate. These efforts align with industry best practices to phase out the usage of SHA-1.

Conclusion

Several of these changes will require that

CAs
ORG

revise their practices, so we have sent

CAs
ORG

a

CA Communication and Survey
ORG

to alert them about these changes and to inquire about their ability to comply with the new requirements by the effective dates.

These updates to the

MRSP
PERSON

underscore

Mozilla
ORG

’s unwavering commitment to provide our users with a secure and trustworthy experience. We encourage your participation in the

Mozilla
ORG

community and the CCADB community to contribute to these efforts to provide a secure online experience for our users.